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U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

UNITED STATES

2016 OCT [REDACTED]
LEEANN FLYNN HALL
CLERK OF COURT

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 10-[REDACTED]-2016

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON.

[REDACTED]

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(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct [REDACTED] as described herein, pursuant

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United

States Code (U.S.C.), §§ [REDACTED] (FISA or the Act).

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1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is made by [REDACTED] a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to [REDACTED]

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Classified by: [REDACTED]

Derived from: [REDACTED]

Declassify on: [REDACTED]

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OI Tracking No. 143045

17-cv-597(FBI) - 1

2. (S) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The

status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information

provided by the U.S. Department of State. [REDACTED]

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3. (S) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application.

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a. (S) The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.

(S) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) (S) The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

(U) (S) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

~~(S)~~ Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Carter W. Page [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

~~(S//NF)~~ This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in violation of U.S. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1). [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

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b7E- 1, 2

I. (U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(~~S~~/~~NF~~) During a recent interview with an identified news organization, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).¹ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There has been speculation in U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public." Despite

Russia's denial, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹ (S//NF) According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement states that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

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~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. elections, [REDACTED] and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor or the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

II. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The Russian Government's Attempts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos² and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]

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² ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] As discussed below, Page has established relationships with Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III.(U)(S) Carter Page.

(U) A. (S) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(S//NF) Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During this time, Page began

business dealings with Gazprom [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) According to information provided by Page during a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Page

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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⁴ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁵ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Page during [redacted] interview

with the FBI, [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

Russia.⁶ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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(U) ⁶ ~~(S//NF)~~ Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia, without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) B. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

~~(S//NF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁷ In

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addition to giving this address, the FBI has learned that Page met with at least two

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Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI

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confidential human source (Source #1),⁸ [REDACTED] reported that Page had a

[REDACTED]
(U)? ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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⁸ ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 [REDACTED] and has been an FBI source since [REDACTED]. Source #1's reporting has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings and the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable. Source #1 has been compensated [REDACTED] by the FBI and the FBI is unaware of any derogatory information pertaining to Source #1.

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~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a

U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) ~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s), described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. [REDACTED]

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~~(TS//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. [REDACTED]

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~~(TS//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹⁰ [REDACTED]

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reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//XNF)~~ [REDACTED]

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⁹ ~~(S//XNF)~~ [REDACTED]

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(U) ¹⁰ ~~(S//XNF)~~ In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

~~(TS//NF)~~ [redacted] according to Source #1, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin]

[redacted]

[redacted] had met secretly with Page

and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

"kompromat"¹² that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹³ [redacted]

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¹¹ ~~(TS//NF)~~ [redacted]

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(U) ¹² (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

¹³ ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁴ (~~TS//NF~~)

[REDACTED]

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¹⁵ (~~TS//NF~~)

[REDACTED]

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¹⁶ (~~TS//NF~~)

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¹⁷ (~~TS//NF~~)

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter Page. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(~~TS//NF~~)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IV.(U) (~~S//NF~~) Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

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Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.¹⁸

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports

¹⁸ (S) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.

[REDACTED]

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the press.

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of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other recent articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly has made public statements in an attempt to create the appearance of distance between Page and Candidate #1's campaign. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's current campaign manager (the September 25th News

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Article). During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page is not part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page has been meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign . . ."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) (~~S//NF~~) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director. In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations is nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet this year with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to

discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.¹⁹

~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations are complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he would be taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations are a "distraction." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

¹⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

V. (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E- 1, 2, 5, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E- 1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E- 1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

VI. (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 4, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 4

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

■(U) [REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Government, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] Based on the

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) (~~S//NF~~) [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that

such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of

the United States, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (S) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

(U) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//NOFORN



5. ~~(S)~~ Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~



6. ~~(S)~~ Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order Number [redacted] [redacted] as amended, is set forth below.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 7

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

~~(S)~~ The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target.

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

9. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, [REDACTED])

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested. The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended. Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13. (S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U)(S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----


~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) VERIFICATION

(X) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on 10/11/16

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1


Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-1
b7A-1
b7C-1

SJA 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) CERTIFICATION

(S) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] requested in this verified application targeting

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(D) (S) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).



(E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 8

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 8

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

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TOP SECRET//NOFORN

(S) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.


James B. Comey
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

John F. Kerry
Secretary of State

Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Antony J. Blinken
Deputy Secretary of State

John O. Brennan
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

Ash Carter
Secretary of Defense


James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence

Susan E. Rice
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan
Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

10  16
Date

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b3-1
b7A-1


I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (S) I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

(S)

[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

W. Page with the Court, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1

Loretta E. Lynch
Attorney General of the United States

Sally Quilliam Yates

Sally Quilliam Yates
Deputy Attorney General of the United States

Assistant Attorney General for National Security

b1-1
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b7A-1

10/1/16
Date [REDACTED]

LA 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) (S) WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,



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b7A-1
b7C-3

U.S. Department of Justice

JAH 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

All Information is considered unclassified
except where otherwise shown

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Filed
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

OCT 2016

UNITED STATES

Classify By: J23J98T32

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

Reason: (C)

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 10-2016

b1-1

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

WASHINGTON, D. C.

b3-1

b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

PERSON

Docket Number: [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ [REDACTED] FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for [REDACTED] and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

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[REDACTED]

2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

[REDACTED]

3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

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Derived from:

Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

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Declassify on:

[REDACTED]

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(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by [REDACTED] and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under [REDACTED] and any other information furnished under [REDACTED]

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WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

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1. The United States is authorized to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the target as follows; [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

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As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall follow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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[REDACTED]

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This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at [REDACTED] Eastern Time

on the [REDACTED] day of January, 2017.

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
Signed

10- [REDACTED] -2016 [REDACTED]

Eastern Time

Date

Time



ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

LOA 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

SECRET

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 01- [redacted] -2017

Declassify On: [redacted]

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

b1-1
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b7A-1

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2017 JAN [redacted]
CLERK OF COURT

(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S. PERSON.

Docket Number: [redacted]

b1-1
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b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct [redacted] as described herein, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), §§ [redacted] FISA or the Act).

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

1. **(U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application** This application is made by [redacted] a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

Classified by: [redacted]
Derived from: [redacted]
Declassify on: [redacted]

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2. ~~(S)~~ Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about December 2016 from information provided by the U.S. Department of State. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. ~~(S)~~ Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application.

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a. ~~(S)~~ **The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.**

~~(S)~~ The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) ~~(S)~~ This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) ~~(S)~~ **The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).**

(U) (S) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

(U) (S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

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(U) (S) Carter W. Page [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

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b7E-1, 2

I. (U) Overview.

(S//NF) This application seeks renewed authority to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Page is

a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).¹

As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S.

Presidential election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E- 1, 2

¹ (S) On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. Although Candidate #1 is now the President-elect, in order to maintain the historical accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original references to Candidate #1 and members of Candidate #1's campaign team will remain the same as in the initial application filed in this matter (see docket number [REDACTED]).

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[REDACTED]

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II. ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A. ~~(S//NF)~~ RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

~~(S//NF)~~ During an interview with an identified news organization, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC).² [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's denial [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

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² (S//NF) According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. [REDACTED]

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 In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities. More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the current U.S. Presidential Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia

took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. and foreign elections, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(U//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U)
B. ~~(S//NF)~~ **The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.**

~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]

b1-1
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

³ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED] As discussed below, Page has established relationships with Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. (U) (S) Carter Page.

(U) A. (S) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(S//NF) Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] During this time, Page began

business dealings with Gazprom [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Page during a [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

interview with the FBI [REDACTED] Page

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

⁵ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁶ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) According to information provided by Page during a [REDACTED] interview with the FBI, [REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 6

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of Russia.⁷ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City

(U) ⁷ ~~(S//NF)~~ Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U)

B. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

~~(S//NF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁸ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),⁹ [REDACTED] reported that Page had a

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

~~(S//NF)~~ (U) ⁸ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 4

~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 [REDACTED] has been an FBI source since [REDACTED]. Source #1 has been compensated [REDACTED] by the FBI. [REDACTED] in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Notwithstanding the suspension of its relationship with Source #1, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the FBI notes that the incident that led to the FBI suspending its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 5

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

[REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

~~(S//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible.

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁰ ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹¹ [REDACTED] reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~XXXX/XXR~~ [REDACTED] according to Source #1, [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1

(U) ¹¹ (~~S//XXR~~) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

b7E-1, 2

¹² (~~TS//XXR~~) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had met secretly with Page

and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

“kompromat”¹³ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

being released to Candidate #1’s campaign.¹⁴ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS)

[REDACTED]

(U)¹³ (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

¹⁴ (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁵ (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁶ (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁷ (S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁸ (S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make

sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

Page. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

~~(S//NF)~~
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

IV. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page. According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.¹⁹

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article

¹⁹ ~~(S)~~ As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about late October 2016, however, after the Director of the FBI sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI has suspended its relationship with Source #1 because of this disclosure.

also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss

any "final" questions the FBI may have.²⁰

~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E- 1, 2

²⁰ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

V. (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 6

■ (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 5, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b7A-1
b7E -1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b7D-1

b7E-1,2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7D-1

b7E- 1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E- 1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

■ (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 2

VII. (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b6C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 2, 4

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S//XNF) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating
and conspiring with the Russian Government, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] Based on the

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) (~~S//XNF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (S) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) 5. (S) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order Number [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] as amended, is set forth below.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 7

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(S) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at least a significant purpose of this request for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, [REDACTED])

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested.

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U)(S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

(S) [REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

[REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

[REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

(U) VERIFICATION

(S) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on January 2017.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1



Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-1
b7A-1
b7C-1

~~SA~~ 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

(U) CERTIFICATION

(~~S~~) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] requested in this verified application targeting

Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

[REDACTED] (B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

[REDACTED] (C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (U) (~~S~~) (D) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).



(E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 8

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

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(S) [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3

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(S) [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

(S) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.


James B. Comey
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

John F. Kerry
Secretary of State

Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Antony J. Blinken
Deputy Secretary of State

John O. Brennan
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

Ash Carter
Secretary of Defense


James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence

Susan E. Rice
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan
Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

1/ 17
Date

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1


I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC, ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (S) I find that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

(S)

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 6

(S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

W. Page with the Court,

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1

Loretta E. Lynch
Attorney General of the United States



Sally Quillian Yates
Deputy Attorney General of the United States

W/ 17
Date

Assistant Attorney General for National Security


b1-1
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~~MA~~ 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

(U) ~~(S)~~ WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,



Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

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b7A-1
b7C-3

JDA 3/17/17
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,
certify that this document is
a true and correct copy
of the original.

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 01-2017

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

SECRET

Filed
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

JAN 2017

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

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All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number: [REDACTED]

PERSON

b1-1

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b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ [REDACTED] FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for [REDACTED] and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

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[REDACTED] 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

[REDACTED] 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

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Derived from: Application to the USFISC in Docket Number captioned above

Declassify on: [REDACTED]

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(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under [REDACTED] and any other information furnished under [REDACTED]

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WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

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1. The United States is authorized to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the target as follows; [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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---- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. ----

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17-cv-597(FBI)-180

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This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires [REDACTED] Eastern Time

on the [REDACTED] day of April, 2017.

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b7A-1

Signed _____ Eastern Time
01 [REDACTED]-2017 [REDACTED]
Date Time



MICHAEL W. MOSMAN
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

[REDACTED]
FISC, certify that this document is a
true and correct copy of the original.

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SECRET

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

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Classify By: J23J98T32
Reason: (C)
Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 4-2017
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES

U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 2017 APR [REDACTED]

WASHINGTON, D.C.

LEE ANN ELYNN HALL
CLERK OF COURT

(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S. PERSON.

Docket Number:

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct [REDACTED], as described herein, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), §§ [REDACTED] FISA or the Act).

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1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is made by [REDACTED], a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to [REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

Classified by:
Derived from:
Declassify on:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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2. ~~(S)~~ Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about December 2016 from information provided by the U.S. Department of State. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. ~~(S)~~ Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application.

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a. ~~(S)~~ The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.

~~(S)~~ The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) ~~(S)~~ This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

(U) (S) **The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia)** is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

(U) (S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Carter W. Page [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

knowingly engage in

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for

or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to

involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

I. (U) Overview.

(~~S//XNF~~) This application seeks renewed authority to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of Carter Page. The FBI believes that Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government [REDACTED]

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b6-2
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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).¹ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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¹ (~~S~~) On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original references to Candidate #1 and members of Candidate #1's campaign team will remain the same as in previous applications filed in this matter (*see* docket numbers [REDACTED])

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b7A-1

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

II. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A. ~~(S//NF)~~ RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

~~(S//NF)~~ During a September 2016 interview with an identified news organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The then DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The then DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~ In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC).² [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED] There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's denial [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3

² ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In

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addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities. More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. and foreign elections, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.**

~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

³ ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED] As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

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b7E-1, 2

⁴ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. (U)(~~S~~) Carter Page.

(U)

A. (~~S~~) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(~~S//NF~~) Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S//NF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During this time, Page began

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

business dealings with Gazprom [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(~~S//NF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(S//NF) According to information provided by Page during a [REDACTED] interview with the FBI [REDACTED]

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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 6

(U) (S//NF) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

Russia.⁸ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(U) ⁸ (S//NF) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Buryakov was released on March 31, 2017.

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b6-2
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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U)
B. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

~~(S//NF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),¹⁰ [REDACTED] reported that Page had a

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b7E-1, 2

(U) ⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 4

¹⁰ ~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1 [REDACTED] had been an FBI source since [REDACTED]. Source #1 has been compensated [REDACTED] by the FBI. As (TS) discussed below in footnote 20, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

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b7E-1, 2, 5

FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. [REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹² [REDACTED] reported

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b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) (S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹¹ (S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(U) ¹² (S//NF) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) [REDACTED] according to Source #1, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had met secretly with Page

and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

“kompromat”¹⁴ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

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¹³ (TS//NF) [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(U) ¹⁴ (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

XXS)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

¹⁵ (S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁶ (TS//XNF)

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁷ (TS//XNF)

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁸ (TS//XNF)

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

¹⁹ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b6-4
b7A-1
b7C-4
b7E-1, 2

(U) (S//NF) [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7C-4
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders

in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

Page. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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IV. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as

deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.²⁰

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article

²⁰ ~~(S)~~ As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about late October 2016, however, after the Director of the FBI sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI has now closed Source #1 as an active source.

also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) (~~S//XNF~~) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign . . ."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director. In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss

any "final" questions the FBI may have.²¹

~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

²¹ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

V. (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

■ (S) [REDACTED]

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b7D-1
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(U)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7C-2
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[REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

b7C-2

(S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

[REDACTED]

b6-2

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

b7C-2

[REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) G. (~~S~~//NF) Page's Letter to the U.S. Department of Justice.

~~(S//NF)~~ In or around February 2017, Page sent a letter to the U.S.

Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was "severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2's] campaign and their political allies last year." In his letter, Page claims that he has not directly supported a political campaign since September 2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2's campaign based on fictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd News Article that Page met with two senior Russian officials

(i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims is "false evidence," to Candidate #2's campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2's campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and the media are lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2's paid consultants and private investigators. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//XX) [REDACTED]

(S//XX) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

VII. (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 4

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XX) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b6-2
b3-1
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//XX) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S//XNF) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Government, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Based on the

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~) [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(~~S~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~~S~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (S) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



5. (S) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. (S) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order Number [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] as amended, is set forth below.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 7

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, [REDACTED])

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested. The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended. Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6



(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6



(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

----- *The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.* -----

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

(U) VERIFICATION

(X) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on April  2017.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1



Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-1
b7A-1
b7C-1

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

(U) CERTIFICATION

(S) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] requested in this verified application targeting

Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

[REDACTED] (B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

[REDACTED] (C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (D) (S) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6



(E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 8

(U) (S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

(S) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.


James B. Comey
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Rex Tillerson
Secretary of State

Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Deputy Secretary of State

Michael R. Pompeo
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense

Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence

H.R. McMaster
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

4  17
Date

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (S) I find that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 6

(S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

W. Page with the Court, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1

Dana Boente

Dana J. Boente²⁷

Acting Attorney General of the United States

April [REDACTED] *2017*
Date

²⁷ (U) Pursuant to Executive Order 13787 (March 31, 2017), Dana J. Boente is serving as the Acting Attorney General with respect to this matter by virtue of the Attorney General's recusal.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,



U.S. Department of Justice

b6-3
b7A-1
b7C-3

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

~~SECRET~~

Filed
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

APR [REDACTED] 2017

UNITED STATES

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

Classify By: J23J98T32
Reason: (C)
Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated
04 [REDACTED]-2017
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ [REDACTED] (FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for [REDACTED] and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

[REDACTED] 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

~~SECRET~~

Derived from: Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above
Declassify on: [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by [REDACTED] and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under [REDACTED] and any other information furnished under [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

1. The United States is authorized to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the target as follows; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

[REDACTED]

As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall follow [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SECRET

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

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SECRET

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at [REDACTED] Eastern Time


on the [REDACTED] day of June, 2017.

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Signed

04 [REDACTED] 2017 [REDACTED]
Date Time

Eastern Time


ANNE C. CONWAY
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

[REDACTED]
FISC, certify that this document is a
true and correct copy of the original.

b6-3
b7A-1
b7C-3

SECRET

UNITED STATES

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated

06-2017 Declassify On:

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
2017 JUN
LEEANN BROWN HALL
CLERK OF COURT

(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON.

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(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct [REDACTED] as described herein, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), §§ [REDACTED] (FISA or the Act).

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is made by [REDACTED] a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to [REDACTED]

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Classified by:

Derived from:

Declassify on:

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

2. (S) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about June 2017 from information provided by the U.S. Department of State. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

3. (S) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts and circumstances in support of this application.

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a. (S) The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.

(S) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) (S) This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) (S) The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

(U) (S) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

(S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Carter W. Page [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

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b7E-1, 2

I. (U) Overview.

(S//NF) This application seeks renewed authority to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of Carter Page. The FBI believes that Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S.

President (Candidate #1).¹ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

¹ (S) On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original references to Candidate #1 and members of Candidate #1's campaign team will remain the same as in previous applications filed in this matter (see docket numbers [REDACTED])

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[REDACTED]

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II. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A. ~~(S//NF)~~ RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

~~(S//NF)~~ During a September 2016 interview with an identified news organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The then DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The then DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC).² [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's denial, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

² (S//NF) According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In

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b7E-1, 2, 3

addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities. More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(S//NF) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. and foreign elections, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. (~~S~~/~~XX~~) **The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.**

(~~S~~/~~XX~~) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

³ (~~S~~) [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED] As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

b3-1
b7E-1, 2

⁴ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. (U) ~~(S)~~ Carter Page.

(U) A. ~~(S)~~ Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

~~(S//NF)~~ Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During this time, Page began

business dealings with Gazprom [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

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b3-1
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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) According to information provided by Page during a [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

interview with the FBI [REDACTED] Page

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁶ (S//NF)

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b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

⁷ (S//NF)

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(~~S//NF~~) According to information provided by Page during a [redacted] interview with the FBI, [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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b7E-1, 2, 6

(U) (~~S//NF~~) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

Russia.⁸ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(~~S~~/~~NF~~)

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(U)⁸ (~~S~~/~~NF~~) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Buryakov was released on March 31, 2017.

[REDACTED]

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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(U) B. (~~S~~//~~NK~~) Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(~~S~~//~~NK~~) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),¹⁰ [REDACTED] reported that Page had a

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b7E-1, 2

(U)⁹ (~~S~~//~~NK~~) [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 4

¹⁰ (~~S~~//~~NK~~) Source #1 [REDACTED] was opened as an FBI source [REDACTED] Source #1 has been compensated [REDACTED] by the FBI. As (T~~X~~) discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

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FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) (~~XS~~/~~XX~~) Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) (~~XS~~/~~XX~~) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. [REDACTED]

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(~~XS~~/~~XX~~) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

(~~XS~~/~~XX~~) [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹² [REDACTED] reported

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b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(U)(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹¹ (S//NF)

[REDACTED]

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¹² (S//NF) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

¹³ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED] according to Source #1, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁴ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had met secretly with Page and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"¹⁵ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹⁶ [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ¹⁵ (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

¹⁶ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁷ (XS//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁸ (KS//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

¹⁹ (TS//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

²⁰ (TS//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-4
b7A-1
b7C-4
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b6-4
b7A-1
b7C-4
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

Page. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TS//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

21 (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IV. ^(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.²²

²² (S) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

(U) (TS//NF) In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) (~~S//NF~~) According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign . . ."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.²³

(U)(~~S~~/~~NF~~) Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

²³ (U)(~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

V. (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

²⁴ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

²⁵ (S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//~~KF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) G. (~~S~~//~~XXF~~) Page's Letter to the U.S. Department of Justice.

(~~S~~//~~XXF~~) In or around February 2017, Page sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was "severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2's] campaign and their political allies last year." In his letter, Page claims that he has

not directly supported a political campaign since September 2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2's campaign based on fictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd News Article that Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims is "false evidence," to Candidate #2's campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2's campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and the media are lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2's paid consultants and private investigators.

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//~~XX~~) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//~~XX~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

VII. (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b6-2

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b6-2

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b6-2

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

b7C-2

[REDACTED]

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

²⁸ (U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3-1

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7E-2, 4

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b6-2
b3-1
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1

b3-1

[REDACTED]

b6-2

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

[REDACTED]

b6-2

b7A-1

[REDACTED]

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b6-2

[REDACTED]

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

²⁹ (S) [REDACTED]

b1-1

[REDACTED]

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S//NF) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Government, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED] Based on the

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(~~S~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~~S~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

4. (S) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. (S) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



6. (S) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order Number [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] as amended, is set forth below.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 7

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(S) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at least a significant purpose of this request for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

9. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, [REDACTED])

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(S) [Redacted]
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b1-1
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b7A-1
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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]
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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

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(S) [Redacted]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.


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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

(U) VERIFICATION

(S) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on 06 [REDACTED] 2017.

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b7A-1



Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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b7A-1
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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

(U) CERTIFICATION

(S) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] requested in this verified application targeting

Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

[REDACTED] (B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

[REDACTED] (C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (D) (S) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

(E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 8

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

(X) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation



Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Rex Tillerson
Secretary of State

John J. Sullivan
Deputy Secretary of State


Michael Pompeo
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense

Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence

H.R. McMaster
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

Date  26/27/17

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(U) APPROVAL

(U) (S) I find that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 6

(S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

W. Page with the Court, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Rod J. Rosenstein
Deputy Attorney General of the United States

6/1/17
Date

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WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature and name of the attorney.

Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

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~~SECRET~~

Filed
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

JUN 2017

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

All Information is considered
unclassified except where
otherwise shown

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C)

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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b3-1

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Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated

06-2017 Declassify On:

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON

b1-1

b3-1

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PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ [REDACTED] FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for [REDACTED] and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

[REDACTED] 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

~~SECRET~~

Derived from:

Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

b1-1

b3-1

Declassify on:

b7A-1

SECRET

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by [REDACTED], and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under [REDACTED] and any other information furnished under [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

SECRET

1. The United States is authorized to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the target as follows; [REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein,

the FBI shall follow [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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
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This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at [REDACTED] Eastern Time
on the [REDACTED] day of September, 2017.

b1-1
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b7A-1

Signed _____ Date _____ Time _____ Eastern Time


RAYMOND J. DEARIE
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

[REDACTED]
FISC, certify that this document
is a true and correct copy of the
original [REDACTED]

b6-3
b7A-1
b7C-3

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